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INFORMANTS' TIPS AND PROBABLE CAUSE: THE DEMISE
OF AGUILAR-SPINELLI-Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
The Supreme Court was expected to announce a decision in Illinois v.
Gates' modifying the exclusionary rule to include a "good-faith" excep-
tion. 2 "[W]ith apologies to all," however, the Court declined to rule on
that issue.3 The Supreme Court instead abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli
test4 for assessing probable cause based on information derived from in-
formants. 5 The Court replaced the Aguilar-Spinelli test with a "totality of
the circumstances" approach, and upheld the search warrant in Gates.6
Gates is the first Supreme Court decision to specifically address the use of
anonymous informants' tips as the probable cause basis for securing a
search warrant. Gates represents the Court's continuing attempt to refine
the use of hearsay affidavits to establish probable cause.
This Note will outline the legal background of Gates, tracing the de-
velopment of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. The Note will then analyze the
Court's abandonment of the Aguilar-Spinelli test and examine the policy
implications in view of recent debate over modifications to the exclusion-
ary rule. The Note will also consider the Court's reasoning within the
framework of possible modifications to the Aguilar-Spinelli test. It con-
cludes that the abandonment of Aguilar-Spinelli was unjustified because
the test provides appropriate guidelines for magistrates to properly assess
hearsay affidavits.
I. BACKGROUND OF GATES
A. Development of the Aguilar-Spinelli Test
Before issuing a warrant, a magistrate must examine the affidavit pre-
sented by the police and conclude that there is probable cause to search,
seize, or arrest. 7 Generally, an affidavit will report those personal obser-
1. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
2. See generally Supreme Court to Decide Revision of Exclusionary Rule, 9 SEARCH & SEIZURE
L. REP. (CLARK BOARDMAN CO.) 93 (1982) (fundamental issue of the continued viability of the
exclusionary rule will be decided in Gates).
3. 103 S. Ct. at2321. Seeinfra note 101.
4. The test derives from Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964). See infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
5. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
6. Id. at 2332,2336.
7. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 (1965). Probable cause is the necessary predi-
cate for any search, seizure, or arrest, regardless of whether a warrant is also required. See United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976); United States v. Brinegar, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76
(1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). The warrant process is preferred to
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vations of a detective or investigator that lead him to believe that a war-
rant should issue. The neutral and detached magistrate then draws her
own conclusions from that same information to determine whether there
is probable cause. 8 The magistrate may not rely solely on the conclusions
of the police officer; she must have enough information to draw her own
conclusions. 9
A determination of probable cause is complicated by the introduction
of an informant' 0 whose hearsay information must establish probable
police discretion and is constitutionally required in all searches with few exceptions. See, e.g..
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (automobile exception); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573 (1980) (plain view exception): United States v. Chimel, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to
arrest exception); Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circum-
stances exception); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (hot pursuit exception).
8. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10. 14 (1948): United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
9. Nathanson v. United States. 290 U.S. 41 (1933). In Nathanson, a warrant was issued on a
statement by the affiant police officer that he had "'cause to suspect and [did] believe" that evidence
was in a specified location. Id. at 44. The Supreme Court held the statement to be void of supporting
facts and insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Id. at 46. Accord Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958).
10. This Note refers to three general categories of informants: anonymous, confidential, and citi-
zen. See Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration, and Probable Cause: Reconciling the Spinelli/
Draper Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 99, 99 n. 1 (1982).
Tips from anonymous informants raise the most difficult issues. It is not possible to verify identity
or motive. Id. at 107 & nn.78-82. This is particularly true when the informant relates information by
way of letter, for there is no opportunity to question him as to his conclusions or his reliability. Id. at
107-08. Anonymous informants are therefore considered presumptively unreliable. People v.
McLaurin, 43 N.Y.2d 902, 374 N.E.2d 614, 615, 403 N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (1978) (Fuchsberg, J..
dissenting) (anonymous tips are notoriously false); People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d
562, 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 386 (1976) (anonymous tips are the "weakest sort"); Comment, su-
pra, at 115.
The most common type of informant is the confidential informant whose identity is known to the
police but not necessarily to the defendant or magistrate. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300
(1967). The typical confidential informant is drawn from the criminal element in society and is paid
or protected by the police. M. HARNEY & J. CRoss. THE INFORMER tN LAW ENFORCEMENT 40 (2d ed.
1968). This proximity to the underworld gives the informant a pool of information to draw upon.
Because he is hidden behind a "cloak of anonymity," however, he is regarded as "inherently sus-
pect.'" Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV
741, 765, 767 (1974): Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A Search for
Meaningful Standards, 81 YALE L. J. 703, 712-13 (1974).
The citizen informant is the most credible type of informant. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S.
573. 599 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). A citizen informant is typically an average person who has
accidently witnessed the commission of a crime or was the victim of criminal conduct. A sense of
civic duty typically prompts her reports to the police; she is therefore deserving of a presumption of
reliability. LaFave, Probable Cause From Informants: The Effects of Murphy's Law on Fourth
Amendment Adjudication. 1977 U. ILL L.F. 1,2 n.5; Comment, supra, at 99. See generally Moylan,
supra, at 765-73 (discussing citizen informants).
Some courts have held that the Aguilar standards were not meant to apply to the citizen informant.
Applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test, others hold that the nature of these informants establishes their
credibility and thus satisfies the veracity prong of Aguilar-Spinelli. See infra note 89. Compare
United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231, 1239 (5th Cir. 1972) (Aguilar and Spinelli standards were not
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cause. In Jones v. United States, "1 the Supreme Court held that a warrant
may issue upon hearsay alone, as long as a "substantial basis for credit-
ing the hearsay is presented." 1 2 In Aguilar v. Texas, 13 the Court identi-
fied the criteria necessary to establish probable cause based on an inform-
ant's tip. The Court in Aguilar held that the hearsay affidavit presented to
the magistrate must contain "some of the underlying circumstances from
which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed
they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the offi-
cer concluded that the informant . . . was 'credible' or his information
'reliable.' "14 Thus, the Aguilar test requires the magistrate to examine
the facts in the affidavit and analyze whether those facts .show (1) the
informant's basis of knowledge and (2) the veracity of the informant's
statements. 15
The "two-prong" Aguilar test was refined in Spinelli v. United
States. 16 Recognizing that the two prongs may not always be expressly
satisfied by the hearsay information, the Court in Spinelli discussed alter-
native ways to satisfy the Aguilar standards. According to Spinelli, a tip
which is sufficiently detailed may permit an inference that the information
was procured in a reliable way, satisfying the basis of knowledge prong
of Aguilar.17 Additionally, the Spinelli Court stated that the inde-
meant to apply to citizen informants) with United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5th Cir.
1973) (status of a citizen informant satisfies the veracity prong of Aguilar-Spinelli), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1129 (1974).
11. 362 U.S. 257(1960).
12. Id. at269.
13. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). In Aguilar, a warrant was issued upon an affidavit that stated
"[a]ffiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that... narcot-
ics... are being kept at the above described premises." Id. at 109. The Court found this affidavit at
least as defective as the one in Nathanson, see supra note 9, because the suspicion was that of an
unidentified informant, not that of the affiant police officer. 378 U.S. at 113-14. The Court therefore
reasoned that the magistrate must have accepted the informant's belief without question and held that
the search warrant was invalid. Id. at 114-16.
14. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
15. See Abramovsky, Illinois v. Gates: A New Standard for Evaluating Probable Cause Based
on Informant's Hearsay, 10 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. (CLARK BOARDMAN CO.) 149, 151 (1983);
Moylan, supra note 10, at 745-47.
16. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). In Spinelli, police officers observed the defendant going to and from a
particular apartment, which had two telephones with separate numbers. A previously reliable, confi-
dential informant told the police that the phones were being used for illegal gambling purposes. The
Supreme Court held a search warrant issued on the basis of this information and corroboration invalid
under the Aguilar test. Id. at 419.
17. The Court cited Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), as a suitable benchmark. In
Draper, the police were told by a confidential informant that Draper would be arriving in Denver by
train with three ounces of heroin on one of two specified mornings. The informant described with
particularity the clothes Draper would be wearing, the bag he would be carrying, and how he would
be walking; detectives verified these detailed facts. With this amount of detail, the Spinelli Court
reasoned that a magistrate could be confident that the informant was relying on something "more
substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld." 393 U.S. at 416.
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pendent police corroboration of the tip would lend credence to the infor-
mation and thus satisfy the veracity prong. 18
These two cases produced what is known as the two-prong Aguilar-
Spinelli test. The basis of knowledge prong may be satisfied by personal
knowledge' 9 or self-verifying detail. 20 The veracity prong may be satis-
fied by a presumptively reliable informant, 2' a demonstrably reliable in-
formant, 22 or sufficient police corroboration of the details provided in the
tip. 23
B. The Gates Case
The Bloomingdale, Illinois police department received an anonymous
letter on May 3, 1978, alleging that Sue and Lance Gates were selling
drugs. The letter provided information on the couple's next drug pur-
chase, stating that Sue would drive to Florida to receive the shipment and
then fly home, and that Lance would fly down a few days after his wife to
18. The Spinelli Court again cited Draper, this time as an example of sufficient corroboration to
support a finding of probable cause. The Court noted that the police had verified all of the tip but the
crucial fact, the presence of narcotics. 393 U.S. at 417-18.
19. Id. at 416; see also Comment, supra note 10, at 102.
20. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416; see also United States v. Smith, 598 F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1979)
(tip must contain "correct and intimate" detail); United States v. Montgomery, 554 F.2d 754, 758
(5th Cir.) (facts within general public knowledge are inadequate), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 927 (1977):
United States v. Tuley, 546 F.2d 1264, 1273 (5th Cir.) (Godbold, J., dissenting) (facts sufficient to
show that the informant had a "personal pipeline" to the suspect's scheme), cert. denied. 434 U.S.
837 (1977).
21. See supra note 10; see also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, Ill (1965) (no ques-
tion raised as to the credibility of law enforcement officers action as informants).
22. 1 W. LAFAVE. SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 3.3(b)
(1978) (an informant with a "track record" of providing reliable information in the past): see Dra-
per. 358 U.S. at 309 (the affidavit named the informant and stated that he had provided reliable
information on numerous past occasions). But c.f. People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29, 482 P.2d 369,
373 (1971) (mere statement that the informant has provided past credible tips is not sufficient to meet
the "reliability" prong of Aguilar).
23. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415. See Moylan, supra note 10, at 748.
Additionally, a statement against penal interest will satisfy the veracity requirement. United States
v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 580, 583-84 (1971) (because the informant provided information incrimi-
nating himself, the magistrate could reasonably infer that the informant was speaking truthfully).
The admission against interest element serves to establish the truthfulness of the statement made by
the informant because persons do not lightly provide police with evidence that may be used against
them. Id. at 583. However, this rationale is less plausible when the informant is a "protected stool
pigeon" whose indiscretions may be tolerated by the police and who may be compensated in some
way for the information. LaFave, supra note 10, at 27. An admission in this instance would be of
little value unless it could be shown that the statement was made under circumstances when the
informant would have no apparent reason to lie. Id. at 28-29. For further discussion, see id. at 23-35:
Note, Probable Cause and the First-Time Informer, 43 U. COLO L. REV 357, 366-68 (1972).
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drive the car back to Illinois. The letter also alleged that the Gates had
drugs stored in their basement. 24
The police pursued the tip and discovered the Gates' address, car regis-
tration, and a reservation made by "L. Gates" for a flight to Florida on
May 5. According to surveillance detectives, Lance Gates arrived in Flor-
ida and went to a Holiday Inn room registered to Susan Gates. The fol-
lowing morning, the two drove north on a highway in the direction of
Chicago. 25 With all of this information, the police obtained a search war-
rant for the Gates' home and car. 26 The search and arrest took place when
the Gates returned to their home on May 7. The search revealed a weapon
and large amounts of marijuana.
The Illinois Circuit Court ordered suppression of the items on the
grounds that the affidavit failed to set forth sufficient facts to meet the
standards of Aguilar-Spinelli.27 The Illinois Appellate Court and Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that nei-
ther prong of the test had been satisfied; the tip did not contain enough
detail to be self-verifying, and the corroboration went only to innocent
facts. They therefore held that the affidavit was inadequate to establish
either the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity. 28
II. OPINION OF THE COURT
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Gates'
fourth amendment rights had not been violated by the search of their car
and house. 29 The Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test and an-
nounced a "totality of the circumstances" approach as its replacement. 30
Under this new approach, the Court upheld the issuance of the search
warrant in Gates.
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that an in-
formant's basis of knowledge and veracity are "highly relevant" in deter-
mining probable cause. 31 However, these two elements are not indepen-
dent requirements; rather, they are "closely intertwined issues" that aid a
24. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (1983).
25. Id. at 2325-26. This corroboration revealed an inaccuracy in the informant's predictions.
The tip stated that Sue would fly back to Chicago, but detectives verified that she drove back with her
husband. Id.
26. Id. at 2326.
27. Id.
28. People v. Gates, 85 I1. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887, 892-93 (1981), rev'd sub nom. Illinois v.
Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
29. 103 S. Ct. at 2336.
30. Id. at 2332.
31. Id. at 2327.
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magistrate in determining the overall reliability of an informant's tip.32
After Gates, the magistrate's task is to look at all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit, including the informant's veracity and basis of
knowledge, and make a practical, common-sense decision as to whether
there is probable cause. 33
The Court concluded that the Aguilar-Spinelli test is overly technical
and rigid. According to the Court, a highly technical application of the
two-prong test places undue emphasis on isolated factors without giving
sufficient weight to the overall facts of the case. 34 The Court explained
that the concept of probable cause cannot be reduced to technical rules
because of the wide diversity among informants and their tips. 35 These
complex rules cannot possibly be understood by those making the final
assessment of probable cause, leading to overly rigid applications of the
test.36
The Court then examined the practical considerations of the Aguilar-
Spinelli test. It claimed that such legal rules are not appropriate to the
warrant procedure because warrants are often issued in the "midst and
haste" 37 of a criminal investigation by laypersons unfamiliar with judicial
refinements of the law. 38 Moreover, the situation is not conducive to full-
scale analysis because of the need for quick decisions during the pressures
of a criminal investigation. The Court therefore reasoned that these lay-
persons should not be shackled by rigid legal rules. 39 Instead, magistrates
should make common-sense decisions based on all the facts, including an
informant's veracity and basis of knowledge. Hence, the new test re-
quires merely that the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affi-
davit supports the conclusion of probable cause. 40
Applying the new totality of the circumstances test, the Court upheld
the search warrant in Gates.41 The Court ruled that the independent police
corroboration and the detail provided by the informant combined to sug-
gest a fair probability of drug trafficking, 42 which was a sufficient basis
upon which to find probable cause. 43
32. Id. at 2327-28.
33. Id. at 2332.
34. Id. at 2330.
35. Id. at 2328-29.
36. Id. at 2330-31.
37. Id. at 2330 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)).
38. 103S. Ct. at 2330.
39. Id. at 2330-31.
40. Id. at 2332.
41. Id.at2336.
42. Id. at 2334-36.
43. Id. at 2336.
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Justice White concurred in the result, but favored a retention of the
Aguilar-Spinelli test and concluded that sufficient probable cause existed
in Gates.44 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, ob-
jecting to the "unjustified and ill-advised rejection of the two-prong
test.' 45 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, concluded that the
warrant was invalid even under the totality of the circumstances ap-
proach. 46
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Defense of Aguilar-Spinelli
The Court's opinion in Gates raised several important issues. The
Court's determination that the two prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test are
not independently necessary to find probable cause may be inconsistent
with prior rulings. Additionally, in characterizing the two-prong test as
unduly complex, the Court failed to recognize the value of a structured
framework for probable cause assessments. Furthermore, the Court over-
looked obvious inadequacies inherent in the totality of the circumstances
test. Finally, the Aguilar-Spinelli test was mistakenly viewed as constitut-
ing a serious interference with law enforcement.
1. Independence of the Prongs
The Gates Court incorrectly advocated the elimination of the indepen-
dence of the two prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. 47 Because of the in-
herent problems with informants' tips, probable cause requires both some
indication that the informant's source and conclusions are reliable and
some assurance that the informant is an honest or credible person. 48
Factors which may satisfy one prong are logically separate from ones
which will satisfy the other. 49 For example, independent police observa-
tions can lend credence to the informant's story and thus support his ver-
acity, but provide no assurance that the informant obtained his informa-
tion in a reliable manner. 50 In the same way, a greatly detailed tip implies
44. Id. at 2347 (White, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 2361 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
48. Id. at 2355 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964); Stanley v.
State, 19 Md. App. 508, 313 A.2d 847, 858 (1974); Moylan, supra note 10, at 773.
49. Stanley, 313 A.2d at 861; Moylan, supra note 10, at 751-52.
50. Stanley, 313 A.2d at 860; 1 W. LAFAVE. supra note 22, at 562-63; Moylan, supra note 10,
at 780; Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Cause for Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 958,
Washington Law Review
that the informant obtained information from personal observations, but
does not support the truthfulness of the informant. 5' Thus, a surplus of
the factors necessary to meet the standards of one prong will not compen-
sate for a deficiency in the other.
The Court specifically suggested that "a deficiency in one [prong] may
be compensated for . . by a strong showing as to the other [prong]. "52
For example, if an informant fails in a particular case to set forth ade-
quately his basis of knowledge but is unusually reliable, the Court sug-
gested that a magistrate can find the requisite probable cause for a war-
rant. 53 If this is the case, a more reliable source could apparently offer
even less in showing the basis of knowledge. Thus, a presumptively reli-
able police officer swearing under oath might not have to reveal the basis
of his conclusions at all. This is directly contrary to the holding in Na-
thanson, expressly affirmed by the Gates Court, 54 that a wholly conclu-
sory affidavit is invalid. 55 If this is not the case, the Court would seem to
be requiring less showing of reliability from a paid and protected "stool
pigeon" than from a police officer. 56
Extending the argument to the veracity requirement, the Court would
sanction the issuance of a warrant upon a hearsay tip when the truthful-
ness of the informant was in doubt if the informant had provided specific
details of his personal observations. 57 However, without sufficient infor-
mation as to the source's trustworthiness, the hearsay-based affidavit
would be treated no differently than an affidavit based on the oath of a
police officer, and the Jones requirement that the hearsay be credited
would not be met. 58
Therefore, unless the Court is willing to accept a finding of probable
cause based on deference to the conclusions and inferences of an infor-
mant, or upon a warrant that cannot be shown to be trustworthy, each
963 n.30 (1969). But see Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith." and Beyond, 69 IOWA
L. REV 551 (1984).
51. Stanley. 313 A.2d at 861-62; see also Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2354-55 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing): Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410, 417, 427 (1969) (White, J., concurring); Note. supra
note 23. at 362.
52. Gates. 103 S. Ct. at 2329.
53. Id.
54. 103 S. Ct. at 2332 (citing Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41,44 (1933)); see also I
W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, at 137-39 (Supp. 1984).
55. See supra note 9.
56. See 103 S. Ct. at 2353 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 1 W. LAFAVE. supra note 22, at 137
(Supp. 1984); Moylan, supra note 10, at 751-52.
57. 103 S. Ct. at 2329-30.
58. In Jones v. United States, the Court made the distinction between an affidavit based on a
police officer's oath, and one based on an informant's hearsay, by requiring from the latter a showing
of "substantial credibility." 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960). See also I W. LAFAVE. supra note 22, at
137-39(Supp. 1984).
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prong must meet the minimum requirements of both Nathanson and
Jones.
2. Characterization of Complexity
The Court in Gates incorrectly characterized the Aguilar-Spinelli test
as overly complicated. The analytical framework of Aguilar-Spinelli is
the best device for structuring probable cause assessments when based on
hearsay information. The Court reasoned that a simple and generalized
approach is justified because of the hurried context in which a probable
cause standard must be applied. 59 On the contrary, because of the "midst
and haste" surrounding the procurement of a warrant and because war-
rants are generally issued by laypersons, 60 a structured inquiry is neces-
sary to ensure greater accuracy. 61 A more precise test will help the issuing
magistrate pinpoint both what the facts are and what they reveal about the
tip. Thus, she will be better able to determine whether probable cause
exists. 62
In portraying the Aguilar-Spinelli test as hypertechnical, 63 the Court
emphasized the form of the test over its substance. The substance of the
test, however, may be retained and clarified by merely expressing it in
terms of the information the test is designed to uncover. There are only
two questions the magistrate need ask herself about the affidavit presented
to her: (1) how did the informant come to the conclusion of illegal ac-
tivity, and (2) why should this particular informant be believed? 64 If she
does not know the answer to (1), then she is accepting the informant's
"mere conclusions." 65 If she cannot answer (2), then she has no reason
59. 103 S. Ct. at 2331.
60. The Court relied on Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348-50 (1972), to suggest
that persons authorized to issue search and arrest warrants cannot keep up with judicial refinements of
the probable cause doctrine. 103 S. Ct. at 2330. This type of logic implies that laypersons are not
qualified to interpret and apply the doctrine as it develops. However, Shadivick held that an issuing
magistrate must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or
search. 407 U.S. at 350; see also Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2345 n. 17 (White, J., concurring).
61. 103 S. Ct. at 2355 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. The totality of the circumstances test does not provide sufficient analytical requirements for
probable cause assessment. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969) (A totality of
circumstances test "paints with too broad a brush. Where . . . the informer's tip is a necessary
element in a finding of probable cause, its proper weight must be determined by a more precise
analysis."); Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 313 A.2d 847, 857 (1974).
63. 103 S. Ct. at 2333. Some lower courts have also expressed confusion with the language of
the test. See Stanley, 313 A.2d at 859; Manley v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 146, 176 S.E.2d 309,
313 (1970). This is primarily because of the overuse of the term "reliability" for different aspects of
the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements. See generally Stanley, 313 A.2d at 857-60; Moylan, supra note
10, at 754-57; Note, supra note 23, at 360 n. 14.
64. See Note, supra note 50, at 960.
65. The inability to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong of the test has always been considered a
643
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to credit the hearsay. 66 In either case, the warrant should not issue. 67 Re-
phrased, the test is neither hypertechnical nor complex. It is a clear and
meaningful approach to guide magistrates in understanding the kind and
amount of information necessary to establish probable cause when an affi-
davit is based on an informant's tip.
Throughout the opinion, the Court instructed the magistrate to consider
"all the circumstances" in making a decision, 68 implying that the Aguilar
line of cases omits some relevant considerations to a probable cause find-
ing based on hearsay information. 69 The Court tells magistrates to con-
sider "all the circumstances" and to balance the "relative weights of all
the various indicia of reliability, ' 70 yet does not specify the "indicia."
Without indicating what those circumstances or indicia may be and to
what extent they may support a finding of probable cause, Gates will only
add confusion to an already complex task.
The Aguilar-Spinelli test is an appropriate mechanism for proper appli-
cations of traditional probable cause standards to hearsay affidavits. 7 1 The
test does not require a technical finding of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, by clear and convincing evidence, or by a preponderance of the
evidence. The magistrate need not be certain that the allegations are true;
rather, she must simply have a basis to ensure that the police are not act-
clear indication of the failure to meet the probable cause standard. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108.
114 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Nathanson v. United States, 290
U.S. 41 (1933). The Gates Court's insistence that the two prongs are not separate, and that a strong
showing in one may compensate a deficiency in the other, 103 S. Ct. at 2329, is inconsistent with this
reasoning. See supra Part IIIA 1.
66. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); see supra note 58. When a warrant relies pri-
marily on an informant's tip, Jones requires more from the tip than would be routinely required of a
police officer. This additional requirement is substantial credibility. See 362 U.S. at 269.
67. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Jones, 362 U.S. at 257.
68. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2328-30, 2332.
69. Previous decisions have taken into account specifically detailed tips, Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. at 416, independent police corroboration, id. at 417, statements made against penal
interest. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 580 (1971), reliable track record, id. at 581-82,
suspect's reputation, id. at 583, and history of arrests and convictions, United States v. McNally, 473
F.2d 934, 940 (3d Cir. 1973). This seems sufficient to take into account the possible factors which
may help determine the basis of knowledge or veracity of the informant. It should also be noted that
these circumstances must be included in the affidavit, for that is all the magistrate may use in the
decisionmaking process. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958).
70. 103 S. Ct. at 2330.
71. See Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 313 A.2d 847, 860 ("As long as we are properly
committed to accept some, but not all, hearsay to establish probable cause, Aguilar and Spinelli are
well-honed instruments for sorting the trustworthy from the untrustworthy.").
Out of the thousands of cases applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the Gates Court cites to three cases
in support of its position that the test has been rigidly applied. 103 S. Ct. at 2330 n.9. Rejection of the
test is unnecessary, however, when the Court could disapprove of those holdings within the Aguilar-
Spinelli framework. Id. at 2350 n.26 (White, J., concurring).
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ing primarily on suspicion.72 Therefore, the Aguilar-Spinelli test is con-
sistent with traditional concepts of probable cause. 73
3. Weaknesses in the Totality of the Circumstances Test
The Court in Gates failed to provide any meaningful guidelines to mag-
istrates in their probable cause determinations. 74 The result is that the au-
thority of the magistrate is strengthened, yet at the same time her role is
weakened. Under the totality of the circumstances test, there are no spe-
cific standards for magistrates to apply. The totality of the circumstances
formulation gives the magistrate considerable power without adequate
guidelines to ensure that the power is implemented consistently within
fourth amendment principles. 75 The role of the magistrate is to stand be-
tween the citizen and the frequently over-zealous police officer and draw
independent conclusions from the facts presented in the affidavit. Under
the totality of the circumstances test, the magistrate may rely more on the
conclusions reached by either the police or the informant.76 Thus, the
magistrate becomes ineffective as a guardian of fourth amendment pro-
tections.77
The Court confuses these two points, finding them analytically incon-
sistent. 78 However, these are two distinct points: (1) Aguilar and Spinelli
preserve the role of the magistrate as a neutral and detached arbiter of
probable cause findings; and (2) Aguilar and Spinelli provide appropriate
structure to keep magistrates' findings within the parameters of the fourth
amendment. 79 Traditional values of the warrant process are incompatible
with the totality of the circumstances approach.
The Gates Court itself illustrated the pitfalls in assessing a hearsay affi-
davit under the totality of the circumstances test. The Gates Court failed
to distinguish between the two locations authorized by the search war-
rant. 80 The tip in Gates revealed to the police information concerning a
72. This is in accordance with the traditional standard of probable cause as less than that neces-
sary to establish guilt but more than bare suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Brinegar, 338 U.S.
160, 175-76 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
73. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105 (1965) (citing Aguilar with approval as con-
sistent with the concept of probable cause); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 577 (1971)
("Aguilar in no way departed from these sound principles" of traditional probable cause).
74. 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2355-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Abra-
movsky, supra note 15, at 152.
75. 103 S. Ct. at 2357, 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. Comment, supra note 10, at 121.
77. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 110-11.
78. 103 S. Ct. at 2333.
79. Id. at 2357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 2335 n. 14 (opinion of the Court).
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prearranged trip by the Gates to pick up drugs and transport them by car
to Chicago. The detail in the tip related only to the trip to pick up drugs. 81
Moreover, the police investigation focused solely on the source's accusa-
tions in the tip that the Gates would be transporting narcotics. 82 Even if
the affidavit established probable cause for a warrant to search the car, the
tip and verification could not support a search warrant for the house. 83 As
a result of the Court's focus on the overall reliability of the tip, rather than
on specific findings, this distinction was overlooked. 84
An application of the Aguilar-Spinelli test to the facts of Gates would
have led the Court to reach the opposite result. The tip provided no infor-
mation to answer the first inquiry; the tip revealed no statement of per-
sonal knowledge, nor was the tip sufficiently detailed to be self-verifying.
Under the second inquiry, the informant's veracity was left in question.
Though the police corroborated many facts in the tip, 85 the corroboration
was incomplete and revealed inaccuracy in the supplied information. 86
81. Id. at 2325.
82. Id. at 2325-26.
83. Justice White, concurring in Spinelli, said:
Nor would it suffice, 1 suppose, if a reliable informant states there is gambling equipment in
Apartment 607 and then proceeds to describe in detail Apartment 201, a description which is
verified before applying for a warrant. He was right about 201, but that hardly makes him more
believable about the equipment in 607.
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,427 (1969) (White, J., concurring).
Substituting the facts in Gates for the ones used by Justice White, the Court allowed the details
concerning the trip to Florida (the description of Apartment 201) to be the foundation for the warrant
issued to search the house (Apartment 607).
84. With respect to the home, the search was conducted on grounds similar to those in Aguilar,
where the magistrate was found to have relied totally on the informant's conclusion. Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. at 109 n. 1. The majority in Gates specifically recognized that the tip standing alone
was insufficient and needed " [s]omething more ... before a magistrate could conclude that there was
probable cause to believe that contraband would be found in the Gates' home and car." 103 S. Ct. at
2326.
85. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2335 & n.13. The value of corroboration lies in its testing and
verifying the source's information. The police must establish "a substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 269 (1960). This is achieved once the police have suffi-
ciently reduced the possibility that the informant is lying. Verification of sufficient amounts of inno-
cent behavior supplied by the informant can achieve this purpose. Once it has been demonstrated that
the source can be trusted, the requirement in Jones has been met. See Aguilar, 478 U.S. at 109 n. I.
But see United States v. Johnstone, 574 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1978) (details not sufficient to rise above
mere suspicion); United States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1976) (innocent detail has insuffi-
cient corroborative value), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977). Because an inverse relationship ex-
ists between the required corroboration and the necessary showing of veracity, the less reliable the
informant, the more probative the corroboration should be in order to meet the veracity prong. Moy-
Ian. supra note 10, at 778; Dawson v. State, 14 Md. App. 18, 284 A.2d 861 (1971). If the amount or
kind of detail is being relied upon in order to establish the adequacy of the tip, then inaccuracy of
material elements should be fatal. See 103 S. Ct. at 2360 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v.
Smith, 598 F.2d 936, 940 (5th Cir. 1979).
86. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2360 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The tip predicted that Sue would drive to
Florida two days before her husband, but the police failed to corroborate that part of the tip and "for
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Thus, the veracity of the presumptively unreliable anonymous informant
was not proven. The partially corroborated tip failed to show a reliable
and accurate informant.8 7 Since neither prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test
was met, the search warrant in Gates should have been held invalid.
B. Policy Implications of Gates
A strong motivating force behind the result in Gates was the Court's
concern with the law enforcement problems associated with use of infor-
mants.8 8 The Court claimed that the Aguilar-Spinelli test hinders law en-
forcement. Because the veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips
cannot be known, and because such persons seldom provide extensive
details of their observations, it is more difficult for anonymous tips to
satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli test.89 Thus, the Court concluded that the test
handcuffs the police, restraining them from providing protection to citi-
zens. 90
all the officers knew, she had been in Florida for a month." Id. at 2360 n. I. At the time of presenting
the affidavit, the police knew only that the pair were on a highway used by travelers to the Chicago
area. But as Justice Stevens' dissent points out, this same highway leads to many tourist and vacation
spots in the Florida area. Id. at 2360 n.3. Finally, the corroboration revealed a material inaccuracy in
the informant's predictions. Sue did not fly back, as suggested in the tip, but instead accompanied
Lance by car. Id. at 2325-26.
87. Id. at 2361 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A tip supported by corroboration must be as
trustworthy as one that would independently meet the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. at415.
88. 103S.Ct.at2331.
89. Id. Here, the Court failed to recognize the distinction between anonymous informants and the
other two classes of informants. See supra note 10. The Court was concerned that the Aguilar-Spi-
nelli test unreasonably restricts the use of information provided by ordinary citizens of unquestion-
able honesty. 103 S. Ct. at 2331-32. This concern is not resolved by the expanded use of information
from anonymous informants. The Court's concern could have been addressed by limiting the scope of
the test to exclude citizen informants, or to find that citizen informants by definition meet the credibil-
ity requirement of Aguilar-Spinelli. See supra note 10. This would focus the test's requirements on
the two classes of informants of more questionable reliability, anonymous and confidential. See gen-
erally Moylan, supra note 10, at 765-73. When an ordinary citizen comes forward with reports of
criminal activity, there is no need to subject the information to the same special scrutiny of undis-
closed informants. See People v. Glaubman, 175 Colo. 41, 485 P.2d 711, 717 (1971) (a citizen
informer's "information should not be subjected to the same tests as are applied to the information of
an ordinary informer"); United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231, 1239 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Aguilar and
Spinelli requirements are limited to the [confidential] informant situation only"); People v. Hester,
39 II1. 2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466, 481 (1968) ("usual requirement of prior reliability . . . does not
apply to information supplied by ordinary citizens"), cert. granted, 394 U.S. 957 (1969), cert. dis-
missed, 397 U.S. 660 (1970). This modification would have allowed the Court to resolve its concern
over the technical application of Aguilar-Spinelli to ordinary citizen informants without doing away
with the special criteria for assessing anonymous and confidential tips.




The Court cautioned that without a relaxed standard for the issuance of
warrants, the police might resort to warrantless searches in the hope that
an exception to the warrant requirement would be available. 91 The Court
therefore concluded that the totality of the circumstances standard sup-
ports and encourages the warrant process and is consistent with traditional
policies of deference to magistrates' decisionmaking. 92
The fourth amendment does not suggest, however, that an improper
search with a warrant is better than an improper search without a war-
rant. 93 Without a conscientious finding of probable cause, a search vi-
olates the Constitution regardless of the presence of a warrant. 94 The
Court should focus not on whether searches will occur with or without
warrants, but on the proper predicate for probable cause. Because if the
police and the magistrate can be reasonably sure of the kind and amount
of information necessary to establish probable cause, the likelihood of
abuses in the warrant process will be diminished. 95
Moreover, the Court's basic premise-that Aguilar-Spinelli hinders
law enforcement-ignored three important considerations. First, because
anonymous informers are presumptively unreliable, they must be shown
to be credible. 96 The fact that a tip is anonymous should make it harder,
not easier, to obtain a warrant. 97 Second, anonymous tips contribute to
police investigative work whether or not they establish probable cause.
The information may be used as a starting point for further investigation
and may ultimately lead to an independent finding of probable cause.
Third, independent police corroboration of the tip may demonstrate suffi-
cient trustworthiness to meet the veracity standard of Aguilar-Spinelli.98
Thus, the Aguilar-Spinelli test strikes a balance between law enforcement
interests in the use of informants' tips and fourth amendment guarantees.
Although not expressly stated, the Court may have been particularly
concerned with the practical necessity for the use of anonymous in-
91. Id.at2331.
92. id.
93. The Court pointed out that a warrant helps to prescribe limits of intrusion by specifying the
police authority, the need to search, and the limits of that power. Id. at 2331. See United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,9 (1977).
94. "lAind no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... ." U.S. CONST amend. IV.
95. 103 S. Ct. at 2358 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting); I W. LAFAVE. supra note 22, at 139 (Supp.
1984).
96. See supra note 10 (discussion of categories of informants); see also Harney, Cross & Liver-
more, The Draper-Spinelli Problem. 21 ARiz L. REv. 945,946-54 (1979).
97. Gates. 103 S. Ct. at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 415.
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formants in the government's war against drugs. 99 If this was indeed the
rationale upon which the majority decided to abandon Aguilar-Spinelli,
then the Court should have voiced and discussed the issue within the
framework of the fourth amendment. If the Court intended to apply a
crime-specific rationale and expand police powers in order to ferret out
drug offenses, the question remains whether the fourth amendment per-
mits such a distinction. 100
2. An Implicit Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
A final policy issue implicated in Gates is the propriety of the
exclusionary rule itself. 10' Though it declined to decide the exclusionary
rule question, 102 the Court effectively created an exception to the
exclusionary rule with respect to probable cause assessments based on
informants' tips. 103
The Court intended that the totality of the circumstances test would
give magistrates qreater discretion by easing the restrictions on obtaining
a search warrant based on hearsay information. 104 With probable cause
parameters enlarged and clouded, the grounds for a magistrate's determi-
99. This underlying rationale surfaced in Justice Brennan's dissent in Gates: "Everyone shares
the Court's concern over the horrors of drug trafficking .... Id. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
A large majority of the cases involving the use of informants are narcotics-related. See United
States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 43-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("the peculiar nature of narcotics crimes
means that arrests are almost totally dependent on tips and undercover work"), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 924 (1981); Rebell, supra note 10, at 703 n.3 ("Reliance on hearsay testimony of informants is
especially significant in narcotics cases."). Therefore, the police begin with a disadvantage they do
not experience in other areas of crime control. M. HARNEY & J. CROSS, supra note 10, at 26. Infor-
mants provide the essential link between police and the drug underworld, supplying valuable infor-
mation-sometimes the only information-about covert drug operations.
100. Justice Brennan thought not: "[B]ut under our Constitution only measures consistent with
the Fourth Amendment may be employed by government to cure this evil." 103 S. Ct. at 2359
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court would have a more compelling argument in favor of a crime-
specific rationale if these types of crimes posed some physical danger to the community. LaFave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 39,
78 (1968).
101. Significantly, the Court in Gates asked both sides to prepare for argument on the issue of
modification of the exclusionary rule, specifically mentioning a possible good-faith exception. Illi-
nois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982) (ordering additional argument).
102. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2321-25. The Court applied its rule against deciding claims "not
pressed or passed upon below" because the question of the good-faith exception had not been specifi-
cally argued in the Illinois courts.
The Court may approve a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule during the 1983-84 term.
See United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983); Com-
monwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488,441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. granted sub nom. Massachu-
setts v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983).
103. The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 184 (1983); Kamisar, supra note 50,
at 588.
104. 103 S. Ct. at 2331.
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nation of probable cause is expanded. In addition, great deference must
be paid to the decisions of a magistrate. 105 In the absence of precise stan-
dards for assessing probable cause, reviewing courts are restricted in en-
forcing the probable cause standard. 106 Thus, a search warrant is unlikely
to be invalidated as long as the magistrate had some justification for con-
cluding that probable cause had been established. 07 In this way, the
Gates Court succeeded in achieving the desired objectives of a good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. Now that search warrants are less vul-
nerable to invalidation, evidence obtained by police officers will be ex-
cluded in only the rarest of situations. 108
If the Court does adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule, 10 9 the combined effect of the exception and Gates will severely
undermine the fourth amendment probable cause requirement when evi-
dence is obtained pursuant to hearsay information."10 To exclude evi-
dence, a defendant will have to show that (1) given the totality of the
circumstances, the magistrate did not have a "substantial basis" for find-
ing a "fair probability" that probable cause existed, and (2) the police
officer did not act in good faith.I' The defendant would have to over-
come deference to a magistrate's decision that is based on vague language
and standards, as well as show that the facts were "so clearly lacking in
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2332 ("duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'sub-
stantial basis for... conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed") (quoting Jones v. United States. 362
U.S. at 271).
107. The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra note 103, at 184-85.
108. Id. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the majority of cases that apply the
exclusionary rule to fourth amendment violations involve informant hearsay information. I W.
LAFAVE. supra note 22, at 500.
109. There is considerable debate as to whether the Supreme Court should adopt a good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980)
(en banc) (adopted good-faith exception), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). See generally Ball.
Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment; The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69
J. CRtM L. & CRIMINoLoGY 635 (1978); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary, Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo L.J. 365 (1981-82).
110. Kamisar. supra note 50, at 589. Carving out a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
would diminish the protections offered by the fourth amendment, in addition to affecting the
exclusionary rule directly. See Ball, supra note 109, at 655-56; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note
109, at 430-3 1. The exception would stifle litigation of fourth amendment violations, prevent judicial
checks on police misconduct, and diminish the effectiveness of the fourth amendment as a general
police deterrent. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 109, at 401-06.
11I. The courts may address the question of good-faith prior to a consideration of whether there
was a violation of the fourth amendment. Such a preliminary examination would preclude further
consideration of fourth amendment doctrine. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 847-48
(5th Cir. 1980) (Hill, J., with Fay, J., concurring specially) (proper to dispose of a case without
addressing the constitutional question), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981); Mertens & Wasser-
strom, supra note 109, at 415 n.258. If so, the opinion in Gates strengthens the position that the
police were acting in good faith because of the lack of clear guidelines.
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probable cause that no well-trained officer could reasonably have thought
that a warrant should issue." 112 In a practical sense, therefore, the Court
in Gates did not avoid addressing the exclusionary rule modification is-
sue. The easing of restrictions for obtaining a warrant results in less evi-
dence being excluded at trial in spite of potential fourth amendment viola-
tions. These sweeping effects of Gates are somewhat inconsistent with
the Court's assurance that it was "hold[ing] the balance true" between
concerns for effective law enforcement and citizens' fourth amendment
rights. 13
IV. CONCLUSION
In Gates, the Supreme Court failed to present any persuasive reasoning
for rejecting the standards of Aguilar and Spinelli. In dispensing with
Aguilar-Spinelli, the Court also failed to provide meaningful guidelines
for probable cause assessments in this complex area. Instead, the Court
adopted an approach which is vague and imprecise, resulting in further
restrictions on the ability of courts to review the probable cause predicate
for issuance of warrants. The better approach would have been to clarify
the existing test and thus retain the standards necessary for magistrates'
decisionmaking process. State courts should be mindful of these consid-
erations when reviewing decisions construing state constitutions in light
of Gates. Moreover, the Gates decision represents another example of the
Burger Court's prioritization of crime control policies and law enforce-
ment interests. 1 14 The Court's ruling in Gates erodes the probable cause
standard, and fails to uphold the fourth amendment's guarantee against
unreasonable governmental intrusions into the lives of citizens.
Laura J. Buckland
112. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2346 (White, J., concurring). Justice White suggested that a warrant
should be prima facie evidence of good faith on the part of police officers. Id. at 2345.
113. Id.at2333-34.
114. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra note 103, at 178.
